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Toward a Psychology of Social
Change: A Typology of Social Change
Roxane de la Sablonnière*
Social Change and Identity Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
Millions of people worldwide are affected by dramatic social change (DSC). While
sociological theory aims to understand its precipitants, the psychological consequences
remain poorly understood. A large-scale literature review pointed to the desperate
need for a typology of social change that might guide theory and research toward a
better understanding of the psychology of social change. Over 5,000 abstracts from
peer-reviewed articles were assessed from sociological and psychological publications.
Based on stringent inclusion criteria, a final 325 articles were used to construct a novel,
multi-level typology designed to conceptualize and categorize social change in terms
of its psychological threat to psychological well-being. The typology of social change
includes four social contexts: Stability, Inertia, Incremental Social Change and, finally,
DSC. Four characteristics of DSC were further identified: the pace of social change,
rupture to the social structure, rupture to the normative structure, and the level of threat
to one’s cultural identity. A theoretical model that links the characteristics of social change
together and with the social contexts is also suggested. The typology of social change
as well as our theoretical proposition may serve as a foundation for future investigations
and increase our understanding of the psychologically adaptive mechanisms used in the
wake of DSC.
Keywords: identity, inertia, normative structure, social change, social structure, stability, pace of change,
psychology of social change
“Change—extremely rapid social change—is the most important fact of life today”
(Nolan and Lenski, 2011, p. xiii).
Zoia is a lively 75-year-old Baboushka. Her eventful life has seen her experience some
less-than-welcome adventures, but she has always managed to adapt to unfamiliar circumstances.
After completing her studies in Moscow, she was, like many other young educated Russians,
deported byUSSR authorities to another state. Her destination was Frunze (later renamed Bishkek),
a land in Central Asia warmer than hers and made slightly cooler by its unfamiliarity. Despite
the diversity of Frunze, with ethnic Kyrgyz, Ukrainians, and other Slavic groups forming sizeable
minorities, the Russian population remained a majority. During the Soviet era, Zoia was told that
she lived in one of the most powerful countries in the world, where crime rates were low and the
population enjoyed decent education and food supply, as well as the opportunity to save money for
retirement.
The diversity of ethnicities eventually bred great tension, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in
the early 1990s deeply affected Zoia’s life. At the age of 54, she learned that her country was in ruins,
that her rights as a Russian were diminished and that her language was widely frowned upon within
the newly formed Kyrgyz Republic, Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, the disorganized authority allowed for
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an explosion in crime rates and increasing scarcity of resources.
Zoia lost all of her life savings. The money she earned was no
longer sufficient to cover basic necessities. Despite her position
as a chief engineer, Zoia was forced to work a second job selling
newspapers at the corner of her street just to make ends meet.
Although Zoia’s story may seem uniquely dramatic, it is
only one among over one billion (Sun and Ryder, 2016). Social
change is indiscriminately pervasive and global—restricted to
neither developing nor western worlds (e.g., Ponsioen, 1962;
Smith, 1973; Chirot and Merton, 1986; Zuck, 1997; Sztompka,
1998; Fukuyama, 1999; Weinstein, 2010; Nolan and Lenski, 2011;
Greenfield, 2016). Dramatic social change (DSC) is the new
normal and can be witnessed presently across a multitude of
contexts from political and economic upheaval, to desperatemass
migration, and from natural or human disasters to technological
advances.
Social change has always been a field of great interest for
the social sciences, especially among sociologists since it seems
that “all sociology is about change” (Sztompka, 1993, p.xiii;
see also Sztompka, 2004). Many sociology texts have entire
sections devoted to social change (e.g., Bauman, 2003; Latour,
2005; Hewitt et al., 2008; Giddens et al., 2011) all aimed at
addressing one main question:What leads to social change? Many
sociological theories have been suggested to explain the different
“macro” processes associated with the onset of revolutions, social
movements, or important technological changes. A “macro”
theory focuses on the structural factors or defining events
that contribute to DSC and are useful when considering how
social changes are brought upon an entire group, community,
institution, nation, or indeed society as a whole. The macro
approach, however, is seriously limited when it comes to “micro”
processes, which focus on the equally important question of the
consequences of social change, or, in other words, how individual
group members are impacted by social change (e.g., Rogers,
2003). Thus, the exclusive research focus on macro processes has
left unanswered the pivotal question: What are the psychological
consequences of social change?
Given the potentially dire consequences of DSC, it is
surprising that psychologists have neglected it as a topic of
rigorous academic pursuit, particularly given the current reality
of vast globalization and massive immigration. To date, research
focusing on the impact of social change on the well-being of
individuals has not been clearly established (Kim, 2008; Liu
et al., 2014). Moreover, the adaptation mechanisms that people
develop when coping with such contexts remain largely unknown
(Pinquart and Silbereisen, 2004).
The goal of the present paper is to argue that psychology needs
to focus on the psychology of social change (de la Sablonnière
et al., 2013; de la Sablonnière and Usborne, 2014). I argue that the
bridge between the “macro” processes of social change and the
“micro” processes of its psychological impacts have yet to be built.
I suggest that social scientists must first focus on conceptualizing
social change in a manner that includes both macro and micro
processes in order to understand individuals’ adaptation to social
change. Thus, as the first step in moving toward a psychology
of social change, I target what is considered the most difficult
challenge: conceptualizing social change.
First and foremost, conceptualizing social change requires
untangling the complexity of the topic by formulating a typology
of social change (see Table 1). To that end, a large-scale
meta-review that assembled original perspectives, theories and
definitions of social change within both the sociological and
psychological literature was performed. The typology of social
change that emerged distinguishes four separate social contexts
associated with social change: stability, inertia, incremental social
change, and DSC. DSC, because of its frequency in today’s
world, and because it is threatening to people, requires special
attention. Thus, the proposed typology of social change drills
deeper and articulates four necessary characteristics for a change
or an event to be labeled as “dramatic social change”: rapid
pace of change, rupture in social structure, rupture in normative
structure, and threat to cultural identity. Finally, I come full circle
by proposing a theoretical model that links together the four
characteristics of DSC within the proposed typology of social
change (see Figure 1). In sum, the typology of social change I am
suggesting can be useful to create a theoretical consensus among
researchers about what social change is that perhaps will allow for
a coordinated, evidence based strategy to address the psychology
of social change.
SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOCIOLOGY AND
PSYCHOLOGY
Today, the field of sociology is at the forefront of social
change theory and research, with a particular focus upon
the factors that constitute and are prerequisites to social
change. Within the sociological literature, three main
theories have been championed for their attempt to explain
social change: Evolutionary Theory, Conflict Theory, and
Functionalist Theory. Each theory is characterized by
TABLE 1 | The typology of social change.
Social
contexts
Definition
Stability A situation where an event, regardless of its pace, does not
affect the equilibrium of a society’s social and normative
structures nor the cultural identity of group members. The
event, may, however, impact an isolated number of
individuals.
Inertia A situation where an event, regardless of its pace, does not
either reinstate the equilibrium of a society’s social and
normative structures or clarify the cultural identity of group
members.
Incremental
social change
A situation where a slow event leads to a gradual but
profound societal transformation and slowly changes the
social and/or the normative structure or changes/threatens
the cultural identity of group members.
Dramatic
social change
A situation where a rapid event leads to a profound societal
transformation and produces a rupture in the equilibrium of
the social and normative structures and changes/threatens
the cultural identity of group members.
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FIGURE 1 | Proposed theoretical model.
key descriptive interpretations in Table 2 where a global
overview of the conceptualization of social change is
offered1.
Despite the first appearance of “social change” in the
psychological literature more than 70 years ago, only a few
isolated psychologists have focused on social change per se and
even fewer have offered a clear definition or conceptualization
of the concept. The first paper that defined social change
was published in the Academy of Political and Social Science
and was entitled Psychology of Social Change. Social change
was defined as “always a slow and gradual process” (Marquis,
1947, p. 75). From that point in time to the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991, there have been very few attempts
to reintroduce social change into the field of psychology (e.g.,
Pizer and Travers, 1975; Schneiderman, 1988). However, after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin
Wall, there has been a small surge of research on social change
in psychology. For example, several edited books (e.g., Thomas
and Veno, 1992; Breakwell and Lyons, 1996; Crockett and
Silbereisen, 2000) and special issues of journals (Silbereisen and
Tomasik, 2010; Blackwood et al., 2013) have focused exclusively
on social change and on people’s reactions to it. For clarity
purposes, Table 3 attempts to summarize the various theories
or perspectives in different subfields of cultural and social
psychology while Table 4 attempts to do so in subfields of
psychology.
1Key sociology readings, such as Human Societies: An Introduction to
Macrosociology (Nolan and Lenski, 2011), The Sociology of Social Change
(Sztompka, 1993), and Social Change (Weinstein, 2010), offer an in-depth
description of these theories that were beyond the scope of the present review.
TABLE 2 | Theories of social change in sociology.
Theories Perspective on social change Key authors
Evolutionary
theory
Society moves in a linear direction
from a simple to a more complex
structure.
Comte, 1853/1929;
Spencer, 1898; Pareto,
1901/1968
Conflict
theory
Individuals and their groups fight to
maximize their benefits. Society is in a
constant state of disequilibrium.
Marx and Engels, 1848
Functionalist
theory
Society is in a constant state of
equilibrium. When a change occurs in
one part of society, adjustments are
made. Social change occurs when
the equilibrium is compromised due
to the rapidity with which events
occur.
Durkheim, 1893/1967;
Parson, 1951
LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT RESEARCH
AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOCIAL
CHANGE IN SOCIOLOGY AND
PSYCHOLOGY
As indicated in the summary tables, both contemporary and
traditional theorists in sociology and psychology have addressed
social change through a variety of macro sociological or societal
lenses, and equally from a plethora of micro, psychological,
or individual perspectives. Theory and research thus far has
demonstrated that social change is a complex entity (e.g.,
McGrath, 1983; Buchanan et al., 2005; Subašic´ et al., 2012) that
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TABLE 3 | Theories and perspectives addressing social change in social psychology.
Theory Perspective on social change Key authors
Social Identity Theory
(SIT)
Social identity relies on two aspects that may be associated with social change. First, SIT is a theory of
social structure that is based on perceptions of legitimacy, stability, and permeability. Second, SIT proposes
identity management strategies such as collective action whereby minority groups aim to maintain or acquire
a positive and distinctive social identity.
Tajfel and Turner, 1986
Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO)
In terms of SDO, social change can be interpreted as the opposition of hierarchy-enhancing attitudes in
individuals with high SDO and hierarchy-attenuating ones in individuals with low SDO.
Sidanius and Pratto, 1999
Relative Deprivation
Theory (RDT)
RDT can be applied to social change in two distinct ways. First, collective relative deprivation occurs when
people compare their group to other groups and feel that their group is worse off which will motivate them to
improve their status by means of collective action. Second, in times of DSC, people are usually confronted
with a unique situation that results in confusion and the loss of social cues. It is therefore easier and more
relevant for them to compare their group’s present situation to their group’s status at another well-defined
time period, than to compare their group with another group. Recent research proposes the use of a
historical trajectory when assessing one’s group’s collective relative deprivation.
Runciman, 1966; de la
Sablonnière et al., 2009a,
2010
Immigration and
Identity Integration (III)
Immigration is a form of social change that requires human adaptation. Research in this field has
demonstrated that individuals who simultaneously identify with their culture of origin and with the receiving
group’s culture and also desire contact with both cultures experience the highest levels of well-being.
Benet-Martínez and
Haritatos, 2005; Berry, 2005;
Amiot et al., 2007
Identity Process Theory
(IPT)
IPT explores the structure of an individual’s identity and the coping strategies used when facing an identity
threat or change that results from social change.
Breakwell, 1986
System Justification
Theory (SJT)
SJT is a theory that explains how to preserve the status quo. It’s more a theory of stability than of social
change. Both advantaged and disadvantaged individuals endorse system-justifying ideologies, to preserve
the existing social structure.
Jost et al., 2004
Identity Threat Theory
(ITT)
In ITT, when a threat to identity occurs as a result of social change, individuals will regulate the structure of
their identity by restoring the imbalance and modifying their identity through different processes that include
integrating the new elements into their identity and assigning a positive or negative valence to them.
Steele et al., 2002
Adjustment to Change
Theory (ACT)
ACT considers how individuals adjust to social change and argues that factors such as social support and
the nature of the event predict the way individuals and groups evaluate social change.
Goodwin, 2006
can be conceptualized in many diverging (and confusing) ways.
The challenge associated with defining social change may well
be to explain why it is an understudied phenomenon (de la
Sablonnière et al., 2013) and highlight the challenge of moving
forward in studying its psychological impact on ordinary people.
The typology of social change presented here offers an initial
attempt at clarifying the meaning of social change from a
psychological perspective. That is, I focus on an individualistic
perspective, but attempt to address the role that macro processes
play in terms of our more micro or psychological focus. Here, I
discuss three main issues that point to the necessity to properly
conceptualize DSC.
First, and most importantly, the conceptualization and
understanding of social change does not reach a consensus within
the scientific literature (e.g., Coughlin and Khinduka, 1976).
Furthermore, few scientists define precisely what they mean
when using the concept (e.g., Saran, 1963). For example, when
social change is studied from a social identity theory perspective
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986), or a sociological conflict theory
perspective, social change is conceptualized almost exclusively
in the context of collective action (Krznaric, 2007). In light of
this, collective action is defined as a means for group members to
achieve an improved social position for their group in the social
hierarchy (Taylor and McKirnan, 1984; Batel and Castro, 2015;
de Lemus and Stroebe, 2015). In contrast, cultural psychology
and developmental psychology conceptualize social change in
a broader manner (e.g., societal transformations such as the
fall of the Soviet Union; immigration) where change is not
limited to the context of intergroup conflict (Pinquart and
Silbereisen, 2004; Sun and Ryder, 2016). The fact that there
is divergence in conceptualizing social change is preventing
coordinated research on social change, because not all types
of social change are considered. With some theories (e.g.,
relative deprivation theory, social identity theory, evolutionary
theory, conflict theory), social change is conceived mostly as
an autonomously controlled and unidirectional process toward
group change; these conceptualizations do not account for social
changes that are outside of human control, such as natural
disasters (e.g., Coughlin and Khinduka, 1976). Equating social
change with collective action (see Stroebe et al., 2015), for
example, neglects uncontrollable social transformations such
as socio-political reforms and natural disasters over which
individuals or groups exert no control. Indeed, the majority of
individuals who experience DSC have little control over such
events. Since previous classifications can only explain some
instances of social change, a theory that would clarify the
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TABLE 4 | Theories addressing social change in subfields of psychology.
Theory Perspective of social change Key authors
Cultural and
evolutionary
psychology
Focuses on how social change and
human biology are linked and aims to
identify how social change influences
human genetics and the way humans
adapt to these changes.
Feldman and Laland,
1996; Laland et al.,
2000
Developmental
psychology
Research in this field has
demonstrated that social change has
the potential to impact developmental
stages for children and adolescents
as well as their identities and
well-being.
Pinquart and
Silbereisen, 2004;
Greenfield, 2009, 2016
Industrial/
organizational
psychology
Focuses on organizational change as
a form of social change. Three main
themes emerge from this field: how to
successfully implement organizational
change, how to limit the negative
impact of organizational change and
understand the psychological
processes of people who are
confronting organizational change.
Kanter, 1991; Burke
and Litwin, 1992;
Sanzgiri and Gottlieb,
1992; Meyer and Allen,
1997; Reichers et al.,
1997
characteristics required in conceptualizing DSC for all types of
change has become a necessity.
The second issue that points to the need for a typology of
social change is that not all social contexts associated with social
change (i.e., stability and inertia) were considered in previous
scientific literature. Most theoretical and empirical work on
social change in both sociology and psychology has focused on
either incremental social change or DSC (e.g., Andersson et al.,
2014; Bernstrøm and Kjekshus, 2015). However, in order to
have a complete theory or typology of social change, it is also
necessary to take into account social contexts where there is no
social change, contexts of either stability or inertia (Table 1).
Knowing about incremental social change, inertia and stability,
as well as how they relate to DSC is psychologically critical.
A clear definition of the four social contexts of social change
can facilitate finding solutions for the population to not only
the consequences associated with DSC, but also the considerable
and potentially unique challenges associated with each of these
social contexts (see Abrams and Vasiljevic, 2014). For example,
a society in a state of inertia may be misconceived as a society
in a state of DSC if no clear understanding of each social
context is achieved. In inertia, there might be less hope for
reverting to a healthy society and consequently less long-term
goals that are developed, whereas a time of DSC, such as a
political revolution, may provide some hope for the future and
some possibilities for some concrete long-term goals. Although
the main focus of our paper is DSC, the full spectrum of social
contexts associated with social change is presented. A more
comprehensive theory of social change capable of accounting for
stability, inertia as well as incremental and DSC is required to
fully understand the psychological processes and ramifications
of social change. Moreover, it is important to define stability,
inertia, and incremental social change because they serve as a
base for comparison or contrast to DSC. As Calhoun notes: “To
understand social change, thus, it is necessary also to understand
what produces social continuity” (Calhoun, 2000, p. 2642).
Finally, the third issue that pushes me to develop a typology
of social change is that, mainly in sociology, a specific event
that can be characterized as social change can be interpreted
in light of different theories of social change. Let us take the
2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan as an example. Evolutionary
theorists may argue that this revolution followed the natural
evolution of Kyrgyz society. On the other hand, functionalist
theorists may argue that there was disequilibrium in Kyrgyzstan
at the time of the revolution. However, it would be beneficial
to conceptualize social change the same way in order to be
able to assess its impact on individuals. What is needed is
a conceptualization of social change that can be interpreted
in light of all the theories and processes that have been
developed thus far. When an in-depth analysis of the literature
is performed, the essential characteristics that define social
change across theories may be ascertained. For example, one of
the characteristics that was identified in conceptualizing DSC
was the rapid pace of social change. The rapid vs. slow pace
of social change is important, for instance, to distinguish a
DSC from an incremental social change where transformations
in the social structure take place without major disruptions.
Whether one conceptualizes social change from a functionalist
theory, a social identity theory, or a developmental theory
perspective, most researchers from these distinctive fields point
to the pace of change as one pivotal and essential element
that characterizes DSC. Thus, when I base the typology of
social change upon such characteristics, garnered from previous
research in both sociology and psychology, an all-encompassing
conceptualization of social change may be obtained, and later
used to guide empirical research independently of the diverging
theoretical perspectives.
My observations on the limitations of sociology and
psychology should not detract from the insightful contributions
these disciplines have made to our understanding of social
change. Indeed, these social scientists have tapped into very
important issues. For example, although collective action is not
the only type of social change, the research on this topic has
successfully identified factors that lead individuals and groups
to be dissatisfied with their conditions and engage in collective
action. However, as Sampson (1989) pointed out: “we have not
gone far enough in connecting our theories of the person with
social change, in particular, with major historic transformation in
the social world” (p. 417). Since our contemporary social world is
characterized by social change (Weinstein, 2010), like Sampson
(1989), I argue that “a psychology for tomorrow is a psychology
that begins actively to chart out a theory of the person that is
no longer rooted in the liberal individualistic assumptions, but is
reframed in terms more suitable to resolving the issues of a global
era” (p. 431).
In sum, social change needs to be clearly examined because
future research is limited without an all-inclusive typology
of social change; one that can bridge the epistemological
differences between theories from various fields of research and
diverging theoretical perspectives. What is needed is a clear
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conceptualization of social change that considers, and includes,
the different characteristics that compose DSC and that were
suggested by researchers from all these diverging areas and
theoretical orientations.
CONSTRUCTING A TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL
CHANGE: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
DSC
Two separate databases from sociology and psychology were
targeted to collate relevant peer-reviewed publications: Sociology
Abstracts and PsycInfo. Including the year 2016, a total of 5,676
abstracts were carefully analyzed (90% inter-judge reliability;
Table 5). Two inclusion criteria were used to determine if a
manuscript was relevant to our typology of social change. First,
the selected abstract, and then the articles, needed to a) focus
on social change by including a relevant original definition or
providing an original perspective on the concept (originality),
or b) focus on one’s perspective of social change at either the
individual or group level (perceptions).
When reviewing the literature, I had one main goal: selecting
and identifying the necessary characteristics of DSC that could
either be present or not in other social contexts (i.e., stability,
inertia, and incremental social change). Scientists refer to the
characteristics in two different ways: (1) formally, when defining
or describing DSC, incremental social change, stability, or inertia,
and (2) informally, when introducing their research on social
change2. I made sure that the included articles sufficiently
addressed one or more of the four selected characteristics (i.e.,
rapid pace of change, rupture in social structure, rupture in
normative structure, and threat to cultural identity, see Table 6).
These four characteristics were chosen after a first reading
of each of the articles (up to October 2013). They emerged
most consistently and were singled out more often for their
importance. From prior knowledge, I anticipated that “pace of
change” and “social structure” would surface. The other two
emerged naturally. From prior knowledge, I also expected the
term “valence of change” (i.e., negative change) to emerge (e.g.,
Slone et al., 2002; de la Sablonnière and Tougas, 2008; de la
Sablonnière et al., 2009c; Kim, 2008). However, that characteristic
did not appear in a significant number of papers. The fact
that some authors report “positive” change as having negative
consequences (e.g., Prislin and Christensen, 2005; Bruscella,
2015) and “negative” change as having positive consequence
(e.g., Yakushko, 2008; Abrams and Vasiljevic, 2014) may explain
why the valence did not emerge as an important characteristic
of DSC.
To conceptualize an event as DSC, all four characteristics
must be present. For example, if an event is affecting only
the normative structure in a gradual manner, it would not be
possible to label that event as DSC. As for the other three
social contexts (stability, inertia, and incremental social change),
2For space limitation, all methodological details and steps I encountered are not
discussed here, but are available upon request to the author.
TABLE 5 | Number of abstracts and articles that satisfied the specified
inclusion criteria.
PsycInfo Sociology abstracts Other
Evaluated abstracts 2814 2862
Accepted abstracts 250 178
Missing articles 12 16
Read and accepted articles 161 114
Other articles and books 50
Total 325
TABLE 6 | Characteristics of dramatic social change.
Characteristics Definition Occurrences
1. The pace of
change
The speed at which an event impacts a
collectivity.
185
2. Rupture in the
social structure
A break with the past so that even core
aspects of society such as social
institutions have to be reconstructed; a
society undergoes a complete
transformation.
196
3. Rupture in the
normative
structure
A break with the past in terms of the
core behaviors of the group members
that now have to be modified
significantly in order to achieve
collective goals.
195
4. Cultural identity
threat
A serious threat to identification and to
the clarity of the shared beliefs, values,
attitudes, and behavioral scripts
associated with one’s group.
205
each has its own unique configuration of characteristics (see
Figure 1)3.
The Pace of Change
The first characteristic that emerged regards the pace, which
could either be slow or rapid, and is defined as the speed at which
an event impacts a collectivity. When defining social change,
researchers from both sociology and psychology distinguish two
types of social change based on the pace of change: incremental
(e.g., first-order change, beta change, decline, gradual, small-
scale) and dramatic (e.g., second-order, gamma, abrupt, collapse,
large-scale).
Theories of social change have explicitly and/or implicitly
acknowledged the pace of social change as a central determining
factor toward its characterization. For example, in one of the
3The term “social change” must be distinguished from the term “event.” An event
may or may not be considered as social change. An event has the potential to bring
social change (Sewell, 1996), be it incremental or dramatic. However, an event is
not always tied to social change as it may represent a form of “happening” that does
not influence the course of history (Nisbet, 1972). In sum, an event is an intrusion
or “disturbances, however mild, of the normal” (p. 26). In contrast to social change,
with the event, the disruption of the normal might only be temporary and not
significant in time.
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earliest versions of their seminal book, Lenski and Lenski (1974)
state: “The most striking feature of contemporary life is the
revolutionary pace of social change. Never before have things
changed so fast for so much of mankind” (Lenski and Lenski,
1974, p. 3, see also Fried, 1964; Rudel and Hooper, 2005). In
their new edition entitled Human Societies: An Introduction to
Macrosociology, Nolan and Lenski (2011) describe how slowly
human evolution has progressed for thousands of years until
about 100 years ago, when humans began to evolve at an
accelerated pace. Similarly, Weinstein (2010) suggests that for
the last few decades, there has been “rapid and accelerating rates
of change in human relations, from the interpersonal to the
international level” (p. xvii).
It is worthwhile to note that a few key authors refer to pace
when distinguishing different types of social change. For example,
in organizational psychology, Nadler and Tushman (1995)
distinguish slow “incremental” change from fast “discontinuous”
change, where the latter would be characterized as DSC in
the typology of social change. According to these authors,
incremental changes are intended to continually improve the
fit among the components of an organization. These changes
can either be small or large; nonetheless, there is a succession
of manageable changes and adaptation processes. In contrast,
discontinuous changes are often linked to major changes in the
global scope of the industry and involve a complete break with
the past as well as a major reconstruction of almost all elements of
the organization. These changes are more traumatic, painful, and
demanding as individuals are required to acquire a whole new set
of behaviors and discard old patterns. These dramatic changes are
not made to improve the fit, but to construct a new collectivity, be
it a nation-state, institution or sub-group of the larger collectivity.
Newman (2000) also distinguishes between first-order change
and second-order change in the context of organizations.
According to him, a first-order change, which is equivalent to
incremental social change, “is most likely during times of relative
environmental stability and is likely to take place over extended
periods of time” (Newman, 2000, p.604). In other words, this
type of change occurs slowly and allows the organization and its
members to adapt to the changes gradually. However, a second-
order change, or DSC, is radical, and transforms the core of
the organization (Newman, 2000). In this case, the change is so
sudden that it does not necessarily allow individuals to adapt
to the process (Buchanan et al., 2005). Similarly, Rogers (2003)
defines social change as abrupt and arises when the entire system
is modified and jeopardized because changes are too fast for
the system to adjust. In his book, Diamond (2005) contrasts
“decline”—where minor ups and downs do not restructure the
society—with “collapse”—an extreme form of several milder
types of decline—which make it a DSC. An example of collapse
is when most of the inhabitants of a population vanish as a
result of ecological disasters, starvation, war, or disease. Examples
of this are genocides such as Rwanda’s which claimed around
800,000 lives, destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure
and displaced four million people (Des Forges, 1999; Zorbas,
2004; Pham et al., 2004; Staub et al., 2005; Schaal and Elbert,
2006; Prunier, 2010; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014), the Armenian
Massacres, which saw the systematic extermination of about
1.5 million minority Armenians in Turkey (Dadrian, 1989, 1998)
or Cambodia’s genocide, which involved the death of almost two
million people through the Khmer Rouge’s policies of relocation,
mass executions, torture, forced labor, malnutrition, and disease
(Hannum, 1989). All these events led to an inordinate number of
deaths and population movements in a short, restricted period of
time.
To be considered dramatic, a social change needs to be quick
and must involve a “break with the past” (Nadler and Tushman,
1995; see also Armenakis et al., 1986). The example most often
used in the literature is the breakdown of the communist system
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (e.g., Kollontai, 1999;
Pinquart et al., 2009; Round and Williams, 2010; Walker and
Stephenson, 2010; Chen, 2015). For example, when Pinquart et al.
(2004, p. 341) introduced their research on social change, they
made a distinction between “gradual” change, such as ideological
change in many Western societies, and “abrupt social change,”
which represents a form of social change that may be spurred
by a sudden, dramatic transformation of economic, political, and
social institutions.
Rupture in the Social Structure
The second characteristic of DSC that emerges from my review
regards a rupture in the social structure of a collectivity or a group.
Social structure is a term that has several different uses in the
sociological literature and this is, in part, because of the lack of
agreement on how the term social structure should be defined
(Porpora, 1989; López and Scott, 2000). One main dispute pits
the dualism of “action” (or agency) vs. “structure” in mainstream
sociological work (for a discussion see López and Scott, 2000).
Consequently, many of the definitions describe behaviors rather
than the role of social institutions (e.g., Cortina et al., 2012;
Tanner and Jackson, 2012; Wilson, 2012). For example, Tanner
and Jackson (2012) define social structure as “the formation
of groups via connections among individuals” (p. 260), which
focuses on meso-level interactions among individuals. Similarly,
Macionis et al. (2008) define social structure as “any relatively
stable pattern of social behavior” (p. 13).
The social structure being discussed in the present paper
refers to macro-level elements of society such as institutions that
facilitate and structure collective interactions, roles or behaviors.
Thus, directly inspired from the most prominent definitions
of social structure in the literature (Marx, 1859/1970; Giddens,
1979; Porpora, 1989; López and Scott, 2000; Stinchcombe, 2000),
social structure is defined here as a system of socio-economic
stratification, social institutions, organizations, national policies
and laws that help structure the norms, roles, behaviors, and values
of community members4.
4Defining social structure represents a challenge that goes beyond the scope of
the present paper. From my understanding of the literature, there are as many
conceptions of social structure as there are scientists working on that concept. The
most important issue that demonstrates how hard it is to define social structure is
the fact that one of the most prominent sociologists, Giddens (1979), refers to a
“duality of structure” when defining social structure (structure vs. agency). On the
one hand, social structure represents institutions or more specifically “collective
rules and resources that structure behavior” (Porpora, 1989, p. 195). Here,
scientists refer to “groups, institutions, laws, population characteristics, and set
of social relations that form the environment of the organization” (Stinchcombe,
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In both sociology and psychology, a rupture in the social
structure is at the heart of definitions of social change. For
example, for Breakwell and Lyons (1996), changes involve the
disintegration of previous national and international order and
sets in motion a process of re-definition and re-evaluation
of societal norms, belief systems, and power structures.
While the communal sense of continuity and permanence is
challenged, social change often represents a period of massive
transformations in political, social, and economic structures
(e.g., Goodwin, 1998; Kim and Ng, 2008; Chen, 2012). This
conceptualization is similar to the definition inspired by
sociologists and provided by Silbereisen and Tomasik (2010, p.
243) where “social change is understood as a more or less rapid
and comprehensive change of societal structures and institutions,
including changes to the economic, technological, and cultural
frameworks of a society (Calhoun, 1992)” or to Kohn’s definition
of radical social change: “we refer not to the pace of change but
to the nature of the change—the transformation of one political
and economic system into a quite different system” (Kohn et al.,
1997, p. 615).
When research focuses on collective action, social structure is
placed at the root of their definition. For example, “Breakdown
Theories” in sociology argue that social movements result from
the disruption or breakdown of previously integrative social
structures. This theory regards collective action as a form of
social imbalance that results from the improper functioning of
social institutions (Tilly et al., 1975). Macionis et al. (2008) also
suggest that, “revolutionary social movements attempt to target
the whole collectivity by radically changing social institutions” (p.
452). Put differently, for social movements and collective action
2000, p. 142), or to “Lawlike regularities that govern the behavior of social facts”
(Porpora, 1989, p. 195). On the other hand, social structure represents “the
underlying regularities or patterns in how people behave and in their relationships
with one another” (i.e., agency; Giddens et al., 2011, p. 3). Here, the definitions
often described normative behaviors or the roles of individuals rather than the role
played by social institutions (e.g., Cortina et al., 2012; Homans, 1951; Mayhew,
1980; Tanner and Jackson, 2012; Wilson, 2012).
This duality lunched a debate in sociology that was reflected not only in Gidden’s
work but also in others sociologists that have devoted their writings to defining
social structure (e.g., Parsons, 1964; Mayhew, 1980). For example, Porpora (1989)
reports four principal ways of conceptualizing social structure that reflect either of
these conceptions. More recently, expending on the work of Bourdieu (1975) and
of Goffman (1983), López and Scott (2000) proposed that there is another aspect
of social structure that must also be considered in addition to the institutional and
relational structures: the embodied structure described as the “habits and skills that
are inscribed in human bodies and minds” (p. 4).
To add to that complexity, some researchers (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979, 1994;
for other “system views” see for example Marx, 1859/1970; Habermas, 1987)
describe the possible “systems” that are, like Russian dolls, embedded in each other.
These systems include the ecological environments “conceived as a set of nested
structures” (Bronfenbrenner, 1994, p. 39): the microsystems, the mesosystems, the
exosystems, the macrosystems, and the chronosystems. This “ecological model”
illustrates the complexity of social structure as a sociological term.
Because of the lack of clarity, or maybe because the definition of social structure
points to different aspects of the social structure, scientists often avoid defining
social structure in their papers, and thereby contribute to the general confusion.
Not that the other aspects or levels of social structure are not important (e.g.,
meso, micro), but the social structure being discussed in the present paper refers
exclusively to macro-level elements of society such as institutions and other
environmental factors that help facilitate and structure collective interactions,
norms, roles, and behaviors.
to occur, social institutions—consequently, the social structure of
society—needs to be altered. In other words, social change “is
the sudden shifting of power from group to group” (Schrickel,
1945, p. 188). To many authors, DSC involves a rupture in the
social structure (e.g., Prilleltensky, 1990) where people need to
“negotiate their way through or around social structures” (May,
2011, p. 367).
Rupture in the Normative Structure
The third characteristic of DSC that emerged from the literature
is the rupture in the normative structure of society.While reading
on the subject, I noticed an important distinction between social
structure and normative structure. As mentioned in the previous
section, that distinction pointed to a duality that is also observed
by theorists in sociology who attempt to define social structure
(e.g., Giddens, 1979; Mayhew, 1980; Porpora, 1989; López and
Scott, 2000). Although both the social and normative structures
refer to the functioning of a society, they each point to two
different aspects of communities and groups. As discussed earlier,
the social structure is associated with macro processes such as
social institutions (e.g., Government), whereas the normative
structure is related to micro processes as they principally refer
to community members’ habitual behaviors and norms.
Based on the work of Taylor and de la Sablonnière (2013,
2014), the normative structure is defined here as the behaviors
of most community members whose aim is achieving collective
goals. In other terms, when the normative structure is clear,
people know what to do and when to engage in specific behaviors
in order to meet the overarching goals of the collectivity. The
definition of normative structure also takes its inspiration from
an array of different domains in the scientific literature. Mainly,
it comes from the definitions of social change that most often
involve a change in behaviors and habits that are disrupted
with the event of a dramatic and rapid social change. For
example, Bishop (1998, p. 406) clearly states that social change
in its transformational form refers to “the ability of a group
to behave differently, even to creating brand-new elements,
within the same social identity.” This definition concurs with
definitions of many more authors, such as Delanty’s (2012)
concept of “normative culture” or May’s (2011), where the
mundane “ordinary” activities take a central place in social
change.
Research and theories on social change have put normative
structure as one of its central tenants. For example, Tomasik
et al. (2010), argue that social change involves “changes of the
macro-context that disturb habits, interrupt routines, or require
novel behaviors relevant for a successful mastery” (p. 247).
These authors also assert that when a gradual social change
occurs, “old options of thinking and behaving are usually still
available whereas abrupt social change is often associated with
an immediate blocking of old options” (Pinquart and Silbereisen,
2004, p. 295). Therefore, in the latter case, it will be necessary to
develop new ways of doing things.
Jerneic´ and Šverko (2001) argue that “major political and
socioeconomic changes may strongly influence people’s life
role priorities, which are otherwise relatively stable behavioral
dispositions” (p. 46). In fact, the normative structure of a society
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is comprised not only of norms and behaviors, but also of roles
that people have in their everyday lives. When a DSC occurs,
these normative elements of people’s lives are all greatly affected
to the point where they need to be redefined. Similarly, McDade
and Worthman (2004) refer to “socialization ambiguity,” a state
present in the context of DSC where “inconsistent messages or
conflicting expectations regarding appropriate beliefs and social
behavior during the course of socialization may be a substantial
source of stress for the developing individual” (p. 52; see also
Arnett, 1995; Tonkens, 2012).
This rupture in the normative structure of society is present
not only when radical changes such as natural disasters occur,
but also when social change is the result of collective actions
within a society. Subašic´ et al. (2012) acknowledge that “what
we do is evidently shaped by social norms, by institutional
possibilities, and institutional constraints. But equally, we can
act—act together that is—to alter norms, institutions, and even
whole social systems” (p. 66). Therefore, when members of
a society come together and engage in collective actions, an
important aspect of society they aim to change deals with the
norms and normative structure.
The importance of the normative component involved in
DSC is in accordance with the Normative Theory of Social
Change, developed by Taylor et al. (Taylor and de la Sablonnière,
2013, 2014; see also de la Sablonnière et al., 2009b). According
to their theory, any group—whether it be at the collective,
community or country level—functions along the basic 80-20
principle in times of stability. According to this principle, most
of the citizens in a functioning society (i.e., 80% of them)
will exhibit normative behaviors that agree with the normative
structure of the society in order to accomplish collective goals
such as achieving a healthy society, and by extension, personal
goals such as maintaining a healthy lifestyle. It is the 80%
that provide social support, when necessary, to the 20% of
citizens who do not function successfully in the society. In
theory, as long as there is a decent majority of people who
conform to the normative structure, a society should function
relatively smoothly. Unfortunately, this is not always the case.
Sometimes, when a society is confronted with DSC, its normative
structure is ruptured which may lead to societal dysfunction or
important disruptions in the “usual” behavior of groupmembers.
In such a situation, the amount of group members exhibiting
behaviors that are in agreement with the collective goals of the
group will be lower than usual. Therefore, it is possible that
instead of having 80% of group members acting according to the
normative rules of the society, only 30 or 40 % of individuals
will follow these rules. In this case, it becomes very difficult for
people to restore the functional equilibrium of the normative
structure as only a few group members are in a position to
provide the necessary social support for the entire society to
function properly (Taylor and de la Sablonnière, 2014). What is
suggested here is consistent with the work of Albert and Sabini
(1974). These authors refer to the importance of a supportive
environment, or social support, which has a sufficient presence
in “slow change,” but not when the context is one of rapid
change.
Threat to Cultural Identity
The fourth characteristic of social change is threats to the cultural
identity of a group. This characteristic is a difficult one to label
since different authors use different terms to describe a threat
to cultural identity (i.e., lack of clarity, identity conflict, identity
crisis, lowered identification, identity confusion). As opposed to
terms such as identity conflict, identity crisis, lack of identity
clarity and identity change, “threat to cultural identity” was
chosen for its capacity to suggest a potential modification in
identity. To be considered DSC, the cultural identity in its current
form must somehow be jeopardized, challenged, or lowered.
Values and beliefs are, per se, questioned and the individual may
sense a general lack of clarity and feel threatened to the core of
his group identity, value system, or beliefs.
Many scientists have defined and researched collective and/or
cultural identity. Recently, Ashmore et al. (2004) have defined
collective identity as “first and foremost a statement about
categorical membership. A collective identity is one that is shared
with a group of others who have (or are believed to have) some
characteristic(s) in common” (p. 81). This definition is similar to
the one from Taylor (1997), in which cultural identity is referred
to as the beliefs about shared rules and behaviors (Taylor, 1997,
2002; Usborne and de la Sablonnière, 2014).
When a social change occurs, it threatens the cultural identity
of all community members. In the present paper, inspired from
previous work on cultural identity, I define threat to cultural
identity as a serious threat to identification and to the clarity
of the shared beliefs, values, attitudes, and behavioral scripts
associated with one’s group. Throughout the literature I reviewed,
cultural identity threat was manifested according to three main
themes. The first theme that stood out is that threats to identity
are associated with a loss of identity or an identity change
(e.g., subtractive identification pattern; de la Sablonnière et al.,
2016). Some authors directly mention the threat to cultural
identity within the context of major social change (e.g., Vaughan,
1986; Smelser and Swedberg, 1994; Sztompka, 2000; Wyn and
White, 2000; Van Binh, 2002; Terry and Jimmieson, 2003). For
example, in his paper on how cultures change as a function of
mass immigration Moghaddam (2012) argues that globalization
results in sudden contact among different groups of people
from different countries. This form of sudden contact has often
resulted in the extinction of many cultures and languages such
as Indigenous peoples around the world. Therefore, globalization
makes people feel that their collective identity is threatened.
Specifically, they experience a loss in many components of their
cultural identity including their values and their language (see
also Van Binh, 2002). The process described by Moghaddam is
similar to the one proposed by Lapuz (1976) who argues that
when social change occurs rapidly, people’s beliefs and values
are threatened since the old guidelines are no longer available.
One consequence of this threat is that people become confused
as values and beliefs contribute to the emotional security and
psychological survival of individuals (Lapuz, 1976; Varnum,
2008). This is in agreement with Albert’s (1977) proposition:
“Rapid change constitutes amajor threat to self-identity” (p. 499).
Similarly, in their book entitled Changing European Identities,
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Breakwell and Lyons (1996) discuss the mechanisms associated
with change in identities in the context of the development of
the European Union and refer to a loss of national identity.
This change in cultural identity is similar to what Wall and
Louchakova (2002) describe as a “shift in the cultural collective
consciousness” (p.253). This consists of a change in the American
self and the emergence of new selves, more independent and alive
in the context of change (see also Neves and Caetano, 2009; May,
2011).
The second theme is associated with the lack of identity clarity
in the event of DSC. This lack of clarity is due to uncertainties
or inconsistencies in the definition of one’s identity. A clear
cultural identity is defined as “the extent to which beliefs about
one’s group are clearly and confidently defined” (Usborne and
Taylor, 2010, p. 883; see also Taylor, 2002). It has been theorized
and demonstrated that an unclear cultural identity can result
in lower self-esteem (Usborne and Taylor, 2010). Thus, if the
entire collective is experiencing an unclear cultural identity, it
may affect people’s ability to function effectively in their society.
Similarly, Macionis et al. (2008) refer to inconsistencies in the
context of socialization in times of important change. People
try to seek out new roles, try new “selves” (Macionis et al.,
2008, p.461). They need to adapt to the inconsistent model their
societies are projecting, which leads to “socialization ambiguity”
(McDade and Worthman, 2004, p. 49). Because social change
brings uncertainty in society, it can affect many aspects of
individuals’ lives such as family relations (Noak et al., 2001),
and aspects associated with the self such as “emotions, values,
perceptions, identity” (Wall and Louchakova, 2002, p. 266).
Finally, as a third theme, authors refer to conflicting identities
within the context of dramatic contextual change. For example,
Becker conducted a study to find out how rapid social change,
such as introducing television in a community that had never
owned televisions before, would impact body images of girls
and women in that community (Becker, 2004). She found
that television caused confusion and conflicts about ideal body
images, and consequently “reshap[ed] [their] personal and
cultural identities” (Becker, 2004, p. 551). In some cases, it even
led to eating disorders (Becker, 2004), which has a direct link
with the way people evaluate and perceive themselves. In other
words, this DSC altered their identity. In fact, severe contextual
changes can challenge the meaning of identity and threaten
its existence (Ethier and Deaux, 1994; Macek et al., 2013).
Similarly, Hoffman and Medlock-Klyukovski (2004) argue that
contemporary organizations are “typically marked by conflicting
interests and contradictory demands on individuals” (p. 389).
This is similar to Chen (2012) who refers to the need for a
transformation and the need to create new cultural norms and
values when confronted to the context of social change (Chen,
2012).
THE TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL CHANGE
In order to properly conceptualize DSC and other social
contexts associated with the state of a collectivity, I suggest
a typology of social change comprised of four different social
contexts: “stability,” “inertia,” “incremental social change,” and
“DSC” (see Table 1 for definitions). These social contexts are
consistent with the theoretical stance of a large number of
sociologists (e.g., Durkheim, 1893/1967, 1897/1967; Watzlawick
et al., 1974; Rocher, 1992; Fukuyama, 1999; Rogers, 2003; May,
2011; Nolan and Lenski, 2011), psychologists (e.g., Katz, 1974;
Moghaddam, 2002; Pinquart and Silbereisen, 2004; Goodwin,
2006; de la Sablonnière et al., 2009a) and scientists in the
field of organizational behavior (e.g., Golembiewski et al., 1976;
Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Armenakis et al., 1986; Nadler
and Tushman, 1995; Thompson and Hunt, 1996).
As many different concepts surround each of the four social
contexts, it was necessary to choose a meaningful label for each.
For “stability” and “inertia,” the choice was relatively easy because
these two labels are commonly used and applied consistently. The
term “status quo” was also considered rather than “stability” (e.g.,
Prilleltensky, 1990; Diekman and Goodfriend, 2007; Mucchi-
Faina et al., 2010). However, because there could also be “status
quo” in the context of inertia (e.g., Subašic´ et al., 2008), the term
“stability” was preferred.
When it came to “incremental” and “dramatic” social change,
the decision was more arduous as authors from different research
fields use different labels. For example, instead of referring to
“DSC,” Golembiewski et al. (1976) refers to “gamma changes”;
Nadler and Tushman (1995), to “discontinuous change.” Others
refer to “second-order change” (Watzlawick et al., 1974; Bartunek
and Moch, 1987; Bate, 1994; Newman, 2000), to “abrupt” (e.g.,
Back, 1971; Pinquart and Silbereisen, 2004) or even to “rapid”
change (e.g., Becker, 2004; McDade and Worthman, 2004). The
term “dramatic” social change was chosen for its ability to
clearly and distinctively define the situation confronting ordinary
people. In a similar fashion, the term “incremental” social change
was preferred over the labels: “first-order change,” “beta change,”
and “continuous change.”
Stability
When there is stability, the actual state of a society is maintained
and the majority of group members are actively attempting
to attain society’s goals. As Weinstein (2010) describes it,
it is a state in which “the established order appears to be
operating effectively, and disturbing influences from within
or from other societies are insignificant” (p. 9; see also Bess
(2015) where no change is equated with stability). Indeed,
none of the four characteristic of social change are present.
For example, the social and normative structures fluctuate
little, and changes do not affect what is defined as normal
behavior in a community (Harmon et al., 2015). Indeed,
personal change, such as bereavement or divorce, still occurs
for some members of society. However, in the event of a
personal change, the social or normative structures are not
disrupted, mainly because the collective social support system
remains functional and people can rely on that support in
case they experience changes in their individual lives. This
is also consistent with the findings of Albert and Sabini
(1974) who argue that changes occurring in a supportive
environment or in a peripheral element of society are
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perceived as less disruptive than those occurring in a non-
supportive environment because the strain upon society is
attenuated.
Consistent with previous research, stability can be defined as
a situation where an event, regardless of its pace, does not affect
the equilibrium of a society’s social and normative structures nor
the cultural identity of group members. The event, may, however,
impact an isolated number of individuals. An example that might
clarify this definition of stability is the event of an election.
Although many people can get excited and seem to be affected by
this event, an election does not necessarily bring about a rupture
in a society, even if it involves a change of political party. The
core elements of society remain stable and citizens resume their
activities without feeling their lives have been overly disrupted by
the election and its outcome. If, for instance, supporters of the
defeated party feel sad and hopeless about the defeat, plenty of
other citizens will be available to help them cope since most of
them will not be affected by the change of government. However,
in a different context, the event of an election may trigger DSC;
for example, when it leads to a social revolution.
Inertia
In contrast with stability, a context where there is inertia involves
a situation that does affect a large number of people, if not most
of the people composing a society. Inertia is defined as a situation
where an event, regardless of its pace, does not either reinstate the
equilibrium of a society’s social and normative structures or clarify
the cultural identity of group members.
In times of inertia, if a “positive” event occurs, there is no
sustainability to maintain its positive impact. Here, the example
of Belarus is used, a country where the population has been in a
state of inertia since the fall of the Soviet Union. Lukashenko has
been the president of the country since 1994. Under his autocratic
rule, Belarus is known as the last dictatorship in Europe. Many
Belarusians are longing for a more democratic and open society,
yet the country remains in inertia. Buchanan et al. (2005) describe
a situation of inertia as an “absence of appropriate activity, a lack
of capability, a failure to pay attention to signals, and thus as
an impediment rather than a desired condition” (p. 190). Inertia
is seen as an undesirable situation where constructive change is
not possible because the organization (or the group) does not
have the capacity (e.g., lack of resources or will) to carry out the
needed change. These authors also argue that when a change is
implemented, its sustainability requires managers and staff (or
community members) to share the same objectives. Uncertainty
about the future must be minimal.
Accordingly, one can assume that the criteria underpinning
sustainability in the event of a change are already absent in a
society that has stagnated due to inertia. Therefore, inertia in a
society such as Belarus constitutes a context where the population
is uncertain about the future and does not share the same long-
term goals as its government. There is a desire for positive social
change, but the actual structure of the society makes it difficult
for any change to be implemented and be sustained. Indeed, for
a positive change to be maintained, it must have the support of
individuals in power since they have the appropriate resources
to address society’s problems. Unsurprisingly, sustainability of
such a change is threatened by an autocratic style of governing
(Buchanan et al., 2005).
In sum, inertia differs from stability. In the case of inertia,
most members of society desire a change from the actual state
of their group, but are unable to properly sustain change due to a
lack of collective social support and an unclear cultural identity.
In contrast, in the case of “stability,” the society functions in an
efficient manner when meeting the collective goals.
Incremental Social Change
Incremental social change is defined as a situation where a slow
event leads to a gradual but profound societal transformation
and slowly changes the social and/or the normative structure or
changes/threatens the cultural identity of group members. The
slow pace is necessary for incremental social change to occur.
Moreover, at least one of the other three characteristics needs to
occur. In their recent paper, Abrams and Vasiljevic (2014) speak
of “growth,” which could represent one form of incremental
social change that involves “wider acceptance of shared values
and tolerance of different values” and of “recession” where
“disidentification” with current groups can occur (p. 328).
One of the most cited examples of incremental social change
is technological innovation (e.g., Rieger, 2003; Weinstein, 2010;
May, 2011; Hansen et al., 2012). Often, there is no social
structural rupture associated with the wide use of technology
and normative structure as well as social support remain intact.
Given its incremental nature, this type of social change does
not instantly produce conflict between old and new behaviors.
For instance, when television was introduced, people bought
it without knowing the consequences of the implementation
of this new technology in their life (Becker, 2004; Macionis
et al., 2008; Weinstein, 2010). Today, in retrospect, we know
that buying a television set entailed a plethora of new behaviors
that altered our society and our way of living. Indeed, some
changes in society seem to be a “by-product of our pursuit of
other goals and interests” (Subašic´ et al., 2012, p. 62). The long
time span that is typical for incremental social change makes
its outcomes unpredictable and unintentional. For instance, as
Weinstein states (Weinstein, 2010), “It would be impossible to
assess exactly what role electronic telecommunication has played
in our global revolution, in part because its effects continue to
reverberate and magnify as you read this” (p. 4).
The cell phone is a particularly good example of incremental
social change. When it came onto the buyer’s market, only a
few exclusive people possessed one. However, over the years, it
became increasingly normative to have a cell phone and, today, it
is almost inconceivable not to have one. Furthermore, when cell
phones were first marketed, they were used mainly for business
rather than for social purposes, which is the current primary use
(Aoki and Downes, 2003). In the same vein, other technological
changes, such as the emergence of personal computers (Kiesler
et al., 1984; Robinson et al., 1997), Internet (DiMaggio et al., 2001;
Brignall III and Van Valey, 2005), and social media (Robinson
et al., 1997; O’Keeffe and Clarke-Pearson, 2011; Oh et al.,
2015) will, in the future, be recognized as key events in the
historical transformation of social structures and social norms.
Such technology does not represent a DSC, but a social change
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nonetheless as it has modified the way people interact with
one another in an incremental manner. As the change occurs
for a relatively long period of time, there is consistency in the
pattern of change, which allows social structures to adapt and,
thus, to remain intact (Nadler and Tushman, 1995). Individuals
experiencing incremental social change are therefore able to
adapt, given that the collective social support is not altered. For
example, there is support for people that have yet to possess
a cell phone; if they want to buy one, but do not understand
how it functions, there are plenty of people that can help them
adapt to this new technology. Even if technological change is
conceptualized here as an incremental change, it is possible that
technology is used to provoke a DSC, for example by instigating
an important social revolution (Rodriguez, 2013).
Despite technology being the most adequate example, other
incremental changes can be observed in other aspects of society
such as in medicine. Indeed, advancement in medicine such
as effective birth control (Goldin and Katz, 2002) was also the
cause of a profound incremental social change. The example
of contraception is crucial as the pill deeply affected gender
roles in society by empowering women by giving them the
capacity to control their sexuality. The pill had not only direct
positive effects on women’s career investments, but also on the
opportunity of attending school longer. The pill forever changed
women’s involvement in our societies and the repercussions of
this incremental social change still echo to us through struggles
for gender equality, but also in the form of women actively
involved in every level of themodern workplace, including higher
managements and governmental position. In other words, the
gradual nature of incremental social change makes it a profound
change in society that neither disturbs the social structure nor the
collective social support system.
Dramatic Social Change
DSC has been defined as “profound societal transformations
that produce a complete rupture in the equilibrium of social
structures because their adaptive capacities are surpassed” (de la
Sablonnière et al., 2009a, p. 325). Although this definition is based
on previous sociological work (Parsons, 1964; Rocher, 1992),
it is adapted here according to the four characteristic of DSC.
Specifically, I suggest that DSC be defined as a situation where
a rapid event leads to a profound societal transformation and
produces a rupture in the equilibrium of the social and normative
structures and changes/threatens the cultural identity of group
members.
As with incremental change, DSC induces fundamental
transformations in society. However, the shift occurs at a
much more rapid pace, provoking a break with the past. Some
authors have highlighted this sense of discontinuity by referring
to DSC as the disintegration of a previous social order or
as the break in a frame of reference (Golembiewski et al.,
1976; Nadler and Tushman, 1995; Breakwell and Lyons, 1996).
They also use terms such as the “construction of something
new,” a “reconceptualization,” or a “re-definition.” Indeed, the
breakdown of a social structure conveys the need for the
reconstruction of core elements in a society. Accordingly, DSC
can be conceptualized as a complete rupture in the social
structure that marks the end of one period and the beginning
of another one, or where a type of society is transformed into
another (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Kohn et al., 2000;
Weinstein, 2010). Other researchers, such as Rogers (2003), also
see rapid social change as intertwined with the social structure.
More specifically, Rogers (2003) states that rapid social change
can threaten social structure by surpassing the adaptive capacities
of individuals. Unsurprisingly, DSC is the most disruptive type of
change not only for the social structure but also for the majority
of society members experiencing it, i.e., the normative structure
as well as cultural identities are challenged. As DSC entails a
re-definition of values, norms and relations, individuals can no
longer rely on their habits and routine; they need to learn new
skills and new definitions andmore challengingly, unlearn the old
ways of doing things (Nadler and Tushman, 1995; Tomasik et al.,
2010). Consequently, DSC is described as a painful and confusing
experience for individuals (Hinkle, 1952; Lapuz, 1976; Nadler and
Tushman, 1995; Kohn et al., 2000; Wall and Louchakova, 2002;
Rioufol, 2004; Hegmon et al., 2008).
A good example of DSC is the breakdown of the Soviet Union.
If I return to Zoia’s example, it is clear that all the people in
Kyrgyzstan and in the Former Soviet Union were affected by
the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Zoia is not the only one
who lost all her savings: the vast majority of people lost their
savings within a matter of days. In terms of social support, whom
could she have relied on if all of her friends were also in the
same situation? Regarding to the fall of the former Soviet Union,
Goodwin (2006) argues that older people were inclined to receive
less social support in part because the majority of the population,
including family members, were struggling with several jobs just
to provide themselves with basic needs. Furthermore, elderly
citizens could not even rely on formal social services because the
collapse of the former Soviet Union caused a decline in formal
state support, which left them no time to rebuild their retirement
income. This illustrates the rupture in the structure of society
that can be found when a DSC occurs as well as the effect on
the majority of ordinary group members who cannot rely on
collective social support.
COMING FULL CIRCLE: THEORETICAL
IMPLICATIONS
Heraclitus, an ancient Greek philosopher, is credited for saying
that “the only thing constant is change.” Gradually or within an
instant, civilizations, societies, communities or organizations that
often seem immutable face multiple DSCs. Social scientists agree
that social changes are not only intensifying but also defining
today’s world. In fact, Weinstein (2010) has underscored that
“rapid change, both peaceful and violent, is a fact of life that
virtually everyone on Earth today has come to expect, if not
unconditionally accept” (p. 3).
For the present paper, my aim was to initiate a conversation
about the psychology of social change. Thus, I briefly reviewed
the major perspectives of social change in both sociology and
psychology. Research conducted in both fields and their subfields
have remained in distinct silos with no effort made toward
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aggregating their findings. This has unfortunately resulted in the
absence of an encompassing approach in the current literature
of social change: social change has never been integrated
into a single perspective that would define or contextualize
DSC within the spectrum of different social contexts. More
importantly, social change has not been conceptualized so that
micro processes, macro processes, and the important relations
between them are addressed. As a result, the typology of social
change introduces different social contexts (e.g., stability) that
can serve as a basis of comparison for DSC. Based on my review
of the literature, I suggest four necessary characteristics of DSC
(Table 6).
The present paper then offers a first step toward unifying the
variety of theories of social change which are currently isolated
from each other. Indeed, our approach aims at addressing the
challenge raised by Sun and Ryder (2016) concerning our need
for “a more nuanced understanding of rapid sociocultural change
combined with sophisticated research methods designed to
address change in a multilevel way” (p. 9). The typology of social
change I am suggesting is an emerging concept; thus, I invite
debate with the hope that the views presented here will stimulate
others to contribute to a needed understanding of DSC within
an individual perspective. More importantly, based on such a
typology of social change, theoretical models could be suggested
as they might offer a guide to understanding the consequences of
social change. For instance, such theoretical models could answer
these three questions: Are the different social contexts associated
with one-another? What makes a society move from one social
context to another (e.g., from stability to DSC)? What is the role
of the different characteristics of DSC? So far, answers to the
three questions raised above were left lingering and the different
characteristics of DSC were not arranged in a sequential way
nor were they identified as key movers of one state of society to
another. In Figure 1, I offer a theoretical model that integrates
the social contexts and the characteristics of DSC as a first step
toward a psychology of social change.
As seen in Figure 1, neither a slow nor a fast pace event will
influence the status quo in both stability and inertia. There will
therefore be no break with the past and so no rupture in the social
and normative structures. Thus, in these two social contexts, if
an event were to occur rapidly, the current situation of a group
or society would remain unaffected by it; that is why pace is not
the only characteristic important to define DSC. For example, if
a plane crashes, which is a rapidly occurring dramatic event, it
does not necessarily affect an entire community. Also, in a state
of stability, when a fast—or slow—event takes place, because the
normative and the social structures are unaffected, there is no
direct threat to the group’s cultural identity. Similarly, when an
event occurs in a state of inertia, there is no additional threat to
the society’s cultural identity, because the normative and social
structure are unaffected.
In contrast, in a state of incremental social change, slow-
occurring events, if profound enough, will gradually change the
social and normative structures, as well as threaten or change
cultural identity. For a DSC to occur, a fast event needs to take
place. If that event has enough impact—therefore not in a state
of stability or inertia—, it will rupture the social structure and the
normative structures. As shown by many different DSC contexts,
there are three possible scenarios when it comes to the rupture
of these two structures: (1) the social structure ruptures first,
which later leads to the rupture of the normative structure (e.g.,
Zhang and Hwang, 2007), (2) the normative structure ruptures
first, which later leads to the rupture of the social structure
(e.g., Centola and Baronchelli, 2015), or (3) both the social and
normative structures rupture simultaneously and influence each
other.
An example of the first scenario would be the latest
presidential elections in the United States. The recent
proclamation of Donald Trump as president carries the
potential for political transformations as well as changes in the
United States’ economic structure (rupture to social structure).
The leadership of Trump’s administration can carry major
structural change that would then lead to a rupture of the
normative structure. At this point, there are indications that
this new governance (social structure) may very well affect the
normative structure. Some members of the population have
become more “open” to expressing their reluctance to have more
immigrants come to the USA, which could eventually lead to
a rupture in normative structure where different ethnic groups
overtly fight each other within America. A second example was
the loss of the French Canadians to the English Canadians at the
Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759. This battle was a pivotal
moment in the 7 Years’ War and gave power to the British troops
(Veyssière, 2013). The result of the battle culminated in the
French losing most of their economical structural powers to the
English and the start of a decline of education. Consequently, the
French mentality and behaviors were modified. The norms had
to be adapted to new rules and to the loss of economic power
(Veyssière, 2013).
The normative structure can rupture before the social
structure in situations such as the African-American Civil Rights
Movement in the United-States, the Fall of Apartheid in South
Africa, or the Quiet Revolution in Québec. If in the past African-
Americans were aﬄicted by a sense of resignation, leaders such
as Martin Luther King Jr. and Rosa Parks gave them the will they
needed to fight for a better future for themselves. This rupture in
the normative structure led to the African-American Civil Rights
Movement which, in turn, brought about changes to the social
structure (e.g., School desegregation). This movement against
racial inequality, segregation and discrimination instigated the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which banned any type of segregation
based on race, color, religion or sex, as well as other changes in
federal legislation.
The breakdown of the Soviet Union is an example that can
be used to illustrate a simultaneous rupture of the social and
normative structures. This event caused major transformations
in the economic, political, and social structures (rupture to
social structure). Simultaneously, a large proportion of the
population found themselves in a great economic crisis, which
led to disruptions in their usual behaviors and habits, such as
working multiple jobs instead of just one (rupture of normative
structures).
When the normative and the social structures are ruptured
(regardless of the order in which this occurs), cultural identity
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will be threatened. There will be a global sense of confusion,
ambiguity, and lack of clarity that might motivate individual
group members to change their identification with their group.
Depending on society’s and the individual’s abilities to cope,
there are two possible outcomes: stability or inertia. If the society
in which DSC has taken place is able to develop coping and
adaptation mechanisms—both at the individual and societal
levels—stability might be restored. Stability would then be
achieved when the social and normative structures however
different are brought back to functionality and when cultural
identity is clear and no longer under threat. In contrast, if
the society and individuals are not able to develop coping
mechanisms, society might enter a state of inertia. In inertia, even
though a society in a state of inertia is no longer going through
major social changes, the need or desire for change still lingers
(Sloutsky and Searle-White, 1993). This can be due to a DSC that
did not, in the end, really change the way a collectivity is ruled
or how its citizens are treated (Moghaddam and Crystal, 1997;
Moghaddam and Lvina, 2002).
CONSEQUENCES OF DSC
Knowing about the range of different social contexts such
as stability, inertia, incremental change, and DSC as well
as the specific characteristics of DSC, has the potential to
guide researchers in terms of assessing DSC and its impact
on the psychological well-being of ordinary group members.
Specifically, after establishing a clear typology of social change,
including potential theoretical models, it is now possible to
move on to the second step of the psychology of social change.
In this second step, we need to address whether and how
different coping mechanisms determine (mediate, moderate) the
influence of DSC on psychological well-being. This question
goes hand in hand with the work of Norris et al. (2002) who
reviewed 160 studies involving natural disasters, mass violence,
and technological disasters. They concluded from more than
60,000 participants that such events have negative repercussions
on participants’ lives. In most of the research they report,
social support, economic status, and age were the identified
factors that may be associated with a better adaptation to social
change. Although diverse factors were suggested, the research
they reported was “atheoretical and little of it is programmatic”
(Norris et al., 2002, p. 249). In accordance with Norris et al.
(2002), I argue that the mediators or moderators involved
in adaptation mechanisms should become the focus of future
studies. The four characteristics I have identified have the
potential to become pivotal in meeting this objective. In sum, the
link between social change and well-being is still unclear (e.g.,
Liu et al., 2014; Sun and Ryder, 2016). Such an investigation
could eventually guide us in designing concrete interventions to
help people adapt to the challenges of DSC (Rogers, 2003; Vago,
2004).
The concept of resilience emerges from the literature as
potentially useful for understanding people’s copingmechanisms.
Resilience is defined as the act of bouncing back in the face
of adversity (Bonanno, 2004). For the specific example of DSC,
resilient individuals would be those who have been able to
maintain their normal functioning and adapt themselves to
adverse situations (Masten, 2001; Curtis and Cicchetti, 2003;
Luthar, 2003; Masten and Powell, 2003). Research has shown that
a significant number of people are able to adapt to challenging
personal situations (e.g., Bonanno, 2004). However, resilience has
mostly been studied within the context of personal changes such
as the death of a loved one or a personal trauma (Bonanno,
2004). Similar to a personal change, this variation in reactions
may be due to individual differences in resilience. This highlights
the need to consider this variable within the psychology of
social change. More concretely, the literature on resilience may
prove to be important when linking people’s perceptions of
the characteristic of DSC to the various paths of recovery
(e.g., resilience, recovery, chronic distress, and delayed reactions;
Bonanno, 2004).
While most research on resilience focuses on “personal
events,” there is, however, another type of resilience known as
“collective resilience” or “community resilience” (e.g., Landau
and Saul, 2004; Kirmayer et al., 2011) which may be more
relevant in the context of DSC as the concept hints that the
majority of society is affected by the change. To illustrate
collective resilience, let us consider the case where the normative
structure of a society is dissolved and its cultural identity
is threatened. Individuals in this situation would no longer
have guidelines and values to individually cope with DSC.
Moreover, every individual affected by the change would be in
the same negative situation. Consequently, individuals might
need to find ways to collectively adapt to the transformations.
The processes associated with resilience may thus differ in
situations of personal vs. social change. I therefore believe it is
important to explore whether the adaptation mechanisms are the
same in a context of DSC where social support is not readily
available.
CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON SOCIAL
CHANGE
In order to speak of a real psychology of social change, we must
be able to actually study social change and its consequences.
The use of a mix of methodologies that would include large
correlational or longitudinal surveys conducted in the field as
well as laboratory experiments (de la Sablonnière et al., 2013;
see also Liu and Bernardo, 2014; Sun and Ryder, 2016) might
prove to be the only way to truly study social change and its
consequences. On the one hand, correlational designs conducted
in the field are necessary to capture people’s firsthand experience
with DSC. They are however limited by their design that prevents
claims of causality. They are also known to be demanding in
terms of both human and financial resources, and may well be
dangerous at times for researchers. Moreover, they require an
intimate knowledge of the culture such as the language as well
as contacts within the community to facilitate the research and
collaboration process.
On the other hand, laboratory experiments are necessary
to establish the controlled conditions needed to understand
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associations between the characteristics of social change and
the consequences. Laboratory experiments, however, are difficult
to design, because it is a challenge to reproduce the actual
characteristics of social change in the laboratory which limits
their ecological validity (de la Sablonnière et al., 2013).
Indeed, social change typically entails various elements such
as historical processes, a collective perspective, and associated
cultural elements (Moghaddam and Crystal, 1997) which must
be taken into consideration in order to replicate their impact
in an artificial setting. For example, the impact of the Tohoku
tsunami in Japan or the Syrian conflict cannot be recreated in
their entirety in a laboratory; nor can all the characteristic of
social change be taken into consideration in a laboratory study
designed to assess the impact(s) of social change. However, if
an array of studies using different characteristic of DSC were
to be conducted (or a combination of multiple characteristic),
the convergence of the results would make us able to better
understand and thereby predict the impact of DSC on individuals
and communities. At the very least in a laboratory, researchers
can expose participants to imagined changes through a scenario
or a video that would include, in the experimental condition,
one or more of the four characteristics of DSC (Pelletier-
Dumas et al., submitted). If the scientific community accepts
that experimental studies will not exactly mirror DSC, but
instead test some of the characteristics in a large number of
experiments, there is potential for laboratory experiments to
bring an important contribution that would eventually allow
a generalization to the real world (for examples see Betsch
et al., 2015; Caldwell et al., 2016; Pelletier-Dumas et al.,
submitted).
The difficulties of conducting research on social change
are, however, amplified by the challenge of obtaining ethical
consent in a manner that allows for timely research. In
terms of experimental manipulations of DSC, obtaining the
ethical board’s consent can be tedious. Indeed, according
to some authors (Kelman, 1967; Bok, 1999; Clarke, 1999;
Herrera, 1999; Pittenger, 2002) deceiving participants is difficult
to justify ethically. This objection on the use of deception
can undermine any attempt to seriously study DSC, as
deception can be a valuable methodological asset (Bortolotti
and Mameli, 2006), especially with such an elusive subject.
Furthermore, research on new grounds require new techniques
and methods on which ethicists can put limits, to ensure that
they do not cause harm to participants (Root Wolpe, 2006).
As with any new technology, methods focused on inducing
dramatic-like changes can be perceived as having unsuspected
risks.
CONCLUSION
In order to truly understand the interplay between individuals
and their context, social psychological theories must take
into account that we live in a constantly changing world.
Unfortunately, although social psychology was rooted in
understanding social change, most modern psychological
theories refrain from addressing a “true” psychology of social
change and prefer relegating social change to the field of
sociology.
Through increasing the focus on social change, we could
combine, on the one hand, sociology’s emphasis on the
importance of social change with, on the other hand, psychology’s
emphasis on the importance of complex individual processes.
As a result, my theoretical proposal aims at bringing together
sociology, where social change is central, and psychology,
where rigorous scientific methods allow us to study the
psychological processes of individuals living in changing social
contexts.
In general, more research on the concept of social
change is needed so that we can help predict, prevent,
and minimize the negative impact of social change. If
psychologists and sociologists work together to move
toward developing a psychology of social change, perhaps
we could come to better understand and help people, like
Zoia, who lost almost everything they had, consequently
improving the quality of millions of lives experiencing
DSC.
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